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Article 4

NOTES
TRADE REGULATION
THE DOCTRINE OF MISUSE OF PATENT

As part of the consideration for an exclusive patent license, the licensee promised to submit any improvements it
might make on the basic patent to the licensor, who had an
option to take out patents on the improvements in its own
name. Any improvement patents thus obtained were to be
licensed to the licensee without additional royalties. The
license was to run for a term of ten years and was .renewable by the licensee for periods of five years, as long as any
pertinent patent, basic or improvement, remained in effect.
The licensee violated its agreement by taking out improvement patents without submitting them to the licensor. The
licensor, pursuant to a provision of the license contract, gave
notice of its election to terminate the license. The licensee
sued in United States District Court for a declaratory judgment that by requiring submission of improvements to be
patented the licensor had misused its basic patent, and that
therefore the requirement was illegal. The licensor counterclaimed for an assignment of the improvement patents. The
District Court upheld the legality of the provision and direct-

ed the licensee to assign the improvement patents. The
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the licensor
had misused its patent and that consequently the provision
was illegal.' On certiorari,2 the Supreme Court reversed
and remanded. 3 The license provision by which the licensor
1.

Stokes & Smith Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp., 156 F.2d
198 (C.C.A. 2d 1946). Notes, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 996 (1946), 14
U. of Chi. L. Rev. 116 (1946).
2. Certiorari was granted "because of the public importance of the
question presented and of the apparent conflict between the decision below and Allbright-Nell Co. v. Stanley Hiller Co., '72
F.2d 392" (C.C.A. 7th 1934). In the Allbright-Nell Co. case defendant refused to assign an improvement patent, in violation
of a term of a license contract. Relief was granted to plaintiff
and defendant was ordered to assign. The defense of misuse
of the basic patent was not raised or discussed.
3. The instant case is noted in 47 Col. L. Rev. 321 (1947), 42 fIl.
L. Rev. 377 (1947), 95 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 804 (1947), 33 Va. L.

(157)
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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol 23

was to become the owner of improvement patents was not
within the doctrine of misuse of patent and therefore was
valid. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith
Co., 329 U.S. 639 (1947).
(Black, Murphy, Rutledge, Burton, JJ., dissented.) 4
The facts before the Court raised the problem of whether
the doctrine of misuse of patent is applicable to invalidate a
patent license which requires the licensee to "submit"5 to
the licensor all improvements made on the basic patent. Although the case was one of first impression,6 the Circuit
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court confined the issue
rather narrowly to considerations of previous misuse cases,7
in which each found controlling principles for its decision.
The Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that the licensor
in no way attempted to exercise any control over articles

4.

5.

6.

7.

Rev. 361 (1947). In remanding, Mr. Justice Douglas stated that
all questions not decided were left open. He specifically indicated
that the license contract might be examined to ascertain whether
it was in violation of the anti-trust laws. The Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision for the licensor. Stokes & Smith
Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp., 161 F.2d 565 (C.C.A.2d
1947). Licensee's complaint, evidence, and arguments had all
been directed to the misuse contention and had asserted no antitrust violation. The Circuit Court of Appeals deemed itself not
justified in remanding the case to the District Court in order
that the licensee might make a record to support the anti-trust
argument. Since the original record contained no evidence to support a conclusion of illegality based on the anti-trust laws, the
court held that the licensee must abide by the decision on the
point on which it had staked its case,' viz., the misuse doctrine.
Black, Rutledge, Burton, JJ., dissented for reasons set forth in
the opinion df the Circuit Court of Appeals. Murphy, J., dissented, believing that the majority's decision "unduly enlarges
the scope of latent monopolies, and is inconsistent with the philosophy enunciated in Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320
U.S. 661, and similar cases."
Although the license required the licensee to submit improvements
before a patent was obtained, the Supreme Court treated the
provision as one requiring assignment of a patent and used the
terminology of assignment. For convenience of expression, the
word "assignment" will be used hereafter.
Other courts have faced the same fact situation, but in no ease
have considered the applicability of the misuse doctrine. Allbright-Nell Co. v. Stanley Hiller Co., 72 F.2d 392 (C.C.A. 7th
1934); Bunker v. Stevens, 26 Fed. 245 (C.C.D.N.J. 1885); American Refinery Co. v. Gasoline Products Co., 294 S.W. 967 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1927).
The Circuit Court of Appeals, through Judge Learned Hand, relied
on the principle of the most recent Supreme Court misuse ease, Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
Mr. Justice Douglas, who wrote the opinion in the Mercoid case,
held that it was not authority for the instant case.
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not covered by the basic licensed patent. In finding a misuse which vitiated the license, it looked ahead to the time
when the license term of ten years will have elapsed and the
basic patent expired. At that time, if the licensee has assigned its improvements and wishes to produce the machine
which had been protected by the basic patent, but in its
most improved form, the licensee will be forced to pay the
licensor for the privilege of using the improvement patents,
which were the fruits of its own ingenuity. Thus, said the
court, the licensor has required the licensee to purchase something in addition to the use of the basic patent. Nor does the
fact that the licensee can, as an alternative, escape the necessity of paying for the privilege of using improvement patents
by exercising its option to renew the license contract, cure
the vice of the situation. In such a case it would be renewing the license contract only to avoid the necessity of paying
for the privilege of using the improvement patents, i.e., to
avoid the consequences of its inventive genius. The Circuit
Court of Appeals thus rested its decision basically on the
fact that the licensor had used its patent either to put the
licensee at a competitive disadvantage or to stifle a normal
inclination to develop improvements. On either hypothesis,
said the court, this license exaction is condemned by the
principle of the cases which have developed the doctrine of
misuse.
The Supreme Court, in rejecting the argument of the
Circuit Court of Appeals, first stated that Congress has
made all patents assignable and has not outlawed any types
of consideration. 8 Thus, it said, there is nothing inherently
illegal in requiring the licensee to assign improvement patents in consideration of the right to use a basic patent.
Second, and more important, because an improvement patent is a monopoly created by a government grant, the licensor
is not using its basic patent to create a monopoly over articles
governed by the general law. It is using its basic patent, a
legalized monopoly, to gain another legalized monopoly.9 The
Court held that this use is not within the rule of the cases
which enunciate the misuse doctrine. The competitive disadvantage which the Circuit Court of Appeals stressed did
8. Rev. Stat. § 4898 (1875), 35 U.S.C. § 47 (Supp. 1946).
9. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S.
637, 644, 646 (1947).
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not impress the Supreme Court. Anyone who divests himself
of any interest, thereafter is as to that interest at a competitive disadvantage to him who has acquired it. This disadvantage is exactly the same whether the consideration was
the privilege to use a patent or was something else of value. 10
The Supreme Court was not influenced by the argument that
the licensor's conduct tended to suppress the licensee's inventive propensities.
Discussion of the decision may be conveniently subdivided into a consideration of abstract basic factors which
inhere in all patent litigation, a consideration of the precedents in which the courts in the instant case found authority
for their conflicting decisions, and a consideration of the
economic consequences attend*ant upon the decision. The Supreme Court would have faced these economic consequences
had it probed more deeply than merely to consider precedent.
The question is: Has the licensor misused its patent so that
its license contract should be stricken down? This question,
posed in the context of a novel fact situation, calls for a
higher level of investigation than a simple reference to precedent.
I.
In the general area of patent litigation, the courts are
faced with two public policies which have great potentialities
for head-on conflict:" the policy of patent law and the
policy of anti-trust law.
10.
11.

12.

The public policy2 of stimulating

329 U.S. 637, 642, 643 (1947).
See Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting in Hartford Empire Co. v.

U.S., 323 U.S. 386, 452 (1946). That such a conflict is not inevitable, see Hamilton, "Patents and Free Enterprise" (TNEC
Monograph 31, 1941) at 148: "No necessary antithesis exists between the grant of patent and the commitment of public policy
to free enterprise." See Wood, "Patents and Antitrust Law"
(1941).
"Patents and Free Enterprise," Monograph No. 31,
cited in the principal case and written by Professor Hamilton of
Yale Law School, has been suggested as the most signficant recent report on the patent system. Smith, "Recent Developments
in Patent Law," 44 Mich. L. Rev. 899, 902 (1946). The considerations touched on in the present note are dealt with exhaustively
by Professor Hamilton; see particularly c. IX, "A Policy for National Economy." See Folk, "Patents and Industrial Progress"
(1942), for treatment of the same subject. The author of the
latter work, special patent advisor to the National Association
of Manufacturers, devotes much attention to Monograph No. 31,
which he characterizes as "twaddle." Id., Part II, c. 5, p. 105.
U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8: "The Congress shall have power
to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing
for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Rights
to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
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technological development has supposedly been implemented
by the patent statutes, which create limited monopolies. 3
The ancient common law policy against monopolistic restraints of trade, commerce, and competition underlies the
prohibitions set forth in the various anti-trust laws. Economic and practical considerations must guide the courts in
allocating to each policy an area in which it may achieve its
purpose without being wholly frustrated by the impingement
of the other.
In the industrialized economy of the United States the
technological progress contemplated by the patent law requires the investment of large speculative capital if the
products of inventive ability are to be exploited and made
available to the public. This speculative capital must come
in large part from private industry, in the form of great and
expensive research laboratories and industrial experiments.
Industry contributes this wealth, speculating on returns on
its investments. The immediate return is often a patent
on the tangible result of the research. Each patent may become a powerful instrument of economic control.
Further, at the present level of industrial development,
any complicated device or machine may well embody many
patents, many statutory monopolies. Unless the law permits
some degree of control over several patents by centralization
in the hands of single industries or manufacturers, the patent
system will be unwieldy and will have created an insurmountable obstacle to efficient large-scale production.14 On the
other hand, the very centralization which the patent policy
urges, the anti-trust policy decries. Maintenance of a workable balance is for the courts.
13. 46 Stat. § 376 (1930), 35 U.S.C. § 40 (1940): "Every patent shall
contain a .

.

. grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, for

the term of seventeen years, of the exclusive right to make, use,
and vend the invention or discovery . .. throughout the United
States and the Territories thereof .... "
14. Wood, op. cit. supra, n. 5, at 100, 101: "It may happen that the
improvement is so great as to render the original invention valueless commercially; while the improvement patent, perfectly valid,
is incapable of separate use .

.

. this situation in legally difficult

to avoid; it is economically impossible to tolerate ....
It may be
categorically stated that the development of the patent pool is the
saving factor of the patent system .

.

. [without it] the system

would long since have been forcd completely out of shape by
the tremendous need for integration in a highly systematized industrial system."
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II.
Consideration of the precedents on which the courts in
the instant case relied illustrates the judicial accomodation
between the competing demands of the conflicting patent and
anti-monopolistic policies. Since 1916 there has arisen a
doctrine that a patentee who misuses his patent will be
denied relief in suits for infringement or contributory infringement. 1" The type of activity denominated "misuse" is
well exemplified in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal
Film Co.,' the leading case for the doctrine. A seller, who
held a patent for a film projector, sold projectors and attempted to exact as a license condition the requirement that
purchasers and subsequent users buy all films used therein
from seller or its designee. An exhibitor leased a projector
from a purchaser and used film which it obtained from a
manufacturer of its own selection rather than the seller's.
In an infringement proceeding, the seller was denied relief
because it had attempted by the license condition to extend
the scope of its patent monopoly by restricting the use of
the patented machine to materials which were not covered
by the patent on the machine. It is to be noted that the film
whose use the seller was attempting to compel was unpatented
at the time.
Subsequent cases in which the misuse doctrine has been
applied by the Supreme Court differ in detail rather than
15.

"'Contributory infringement' is the intentional aiding of one
person by another in the unlawful making or selling or using of
the patented invention which is usually done by making or selling
a part of the patented invention with the intent or purpose of
so aiding." American Lecithin Co. v. J. C. Ferguson Mfg. Works,
19 F.Supp. 294, 299 (D.C.R.I. 1937).
16. 243 U.S. 502 (1916), overruling Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224
U.S. 1 (1911).
Most succeeding Supreme Court cases which
rely on the Motion Picture case are of two types. The first
type includes those in which the misuse doctrine is developed.
A second line of cases includes actions under the anti-trust laws.
In the latter, the Motion Picture case is referred to in determining the area of permissible conduct under the patent laws,
and thus in deciding whether the particular defendant's otherwise
monopolistic activity is protected because of a patent grant. See,
e.g., Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. U.S., 309 U.S. 436 (1939) (Sherman Act); Interstate Circuit Inc. v. U.S., 306 U.S. 208 (1938)
(Sherman Act); International Business Mach. Corp. v. U.S.,
298 U.S. 124 (1935) (Clayton Act); U.S. v. General Electric Co.,
272 U.S. 476 (1926) (Sherman Act); U.S. v. United Shoe Mach.
Co., 258 U.S. 433 (1921) (Clayton Act); U.S. v. United Shoe
Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1917) (Sherman Act).
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in essence.1 7 In all, the activity condemned was a patentee's
attempt to extend its control by requiring the use of unpatented materials in connection with the patented device,18
process, 19 or combination.20 That is, the patentee attempted
to use its patent to force its licensee to buy unpatented materials either from the patentee or from its subsidiary or
designee. These later cases are material here chiefly because
they supply the basis for an adequate rationale for the misuse
doctrine emerging from those decisions. Morton Salt Co. v.
G. S. Suppiger Co. 2 1 teaches that relief is denied to protect
a public interest and not the private interest of the defendant
in any particular case, although obviously the defendant is
incidentally benefited. The public interest suffers as the result of an attempt to restrain competition and control the
market. The specific public interest of which the Court is
solicitous is identified in Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., as the "protection of the public in a system of
free enterprise." 22 The Court has been sedulous to point out
17. The importance to the operation of the patented invention of the
unpatented material sought to be controlled is irrelevant and will
not overcome the fact that the attempt to control is a misuse.
Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Corp., 284 U.S. 27 (1930).
Even where the patent is on a combination of unpatented elements, so that that which is patented exists as a patentable combination only by virtue of the unpatented parts, the patentee cannot
legally extend its monopoly to those parts. Mercoid Corp. v. MidContinent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944). It is unimportant
that the patentee can profit from the invention only if it requires
the purchase of other goods from it. B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314
U.S. 495 (1941). Subtlety of method will not aid the patentee;
merely avoiding written contracts and express conditions will not
prevent the court from denying relief if there was an attempt to
monopolize the unpatented. B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, supra;
Leitch Manufacturing Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1937). Res
judicata will not be applied in a second infringement action to prevent an infringer from raising the defense of patentee's misuse
after he failed to raise it in the first. Mercoid Corp. v. MidContinent Investment Co., supra.
18. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1941); Carbice
Corp. v. American Patents Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1930).
19. B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1941); Leitch Manufacturing Co. v. Barber Co., 312 U.S. 458 (1937).

20. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661
(1944).
21.

22.

314 U.S. 488, 494 (1941): "It is the adverse effect upon the public
interest, together with the patentee's course of conduct, which
disqualifies him to maintain the suit." Therefore defendant was
allowed to raise the defense of misuse despite the fact that he
was a direct infringer who had in no degree suffered from the
plaintiff's misuse.
820 U.S. 661, 665 (1944).
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that the doctrine of misuse, although it may be an antimonopolistic weapon, is not to be used indiscriminately as
an alternative for the anti-trust laws. The theories of the
two are different, and a patentee's activity which falls short
of an unreasonable restraint of trade or commerce may still
come within the protective sweep of misuse, and therefore
2
be illegal.
Focusing attention on the facts of the principal case,
it seems clear that the Supreme Court was correct in saying
that nothing in its past decisions required it to strike down
the provision of the license in suit. In all previous cases the
patentee had wielded its statutory grant to deprive its licensee
of the free choice among many sellers of unpatented goods,
all theoretically competing for business. To the extent that
the licensee was forced to buy these otherwise unrestricted
goods from the patentee, the marketing opportunities of the
patentee's competitors were restricted, since competition for
the licensee's custom no longer prevailed. 24 The public interest in the maintenance of free competitive enterprise dictated
that an attempt to effect a limitation of the available market23.

In Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1941),
the District Court denied relief in an infringement proceeding on
the ground that plaintiff had misused its patent. The Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed because the
use of the patent was not shown to violate § 3 of the Clayton Act.
It did not appear that the use of the patent substantially lessened
competition or tended to create a monopoly. In reversing, the
Supreme Court said, "But the present suit is for infringement
of a patent. The question we must decide is not necessarily
whether respondent has violated the Clayton Act, but whether
a court of equity will lend its aid to protect a patent monopoly
when respondent is using it as the effective means of restricting
competition with its sale of an unpatented article." Id. at 490. This
distinction between misuse of patent and violation of anti-trust
laws was recognized by the Supreme Court in the principal case.
It seems, however, not always to be clearly understood or at any
rate, clearly stated. See, e.g., Hearings Before Committee on
Patents on S.2303 and S. 2491, 77th Cong. 2nd Sess. 2001 (1942):
"The Chairman: Is it your view that the Supreme Court has
held that it is a defense to an infringement suit that the plaintiff is engaged in a violation of anti-trust laws?
"Mr. [Assistant Attorney General] Arnold: Yes.
"Chairman: When was that decided?
"Mr. Arnold: The last decision on that would be the Morton Salt
case."
24. That it is market control and the destruction of competitive forces
which are the true reasons for the misuse rule, see Morton Salt
Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1941), followed in
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665,
667 (1944).
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ing opportunities of the patentee's competitors be declared
illegal, quite apart from the necessity of determining whether
the attempted restraint attained the proportions of an antitrust violation. Thus in each case the courts held the specific
licensing exaction illegal on its face, without going behind the
terms of the license to other factors.
In the instant case, if attention be directed only to the
terms of the license, the rationalizing distinction is apparent.
The patentee used its basic patent to compel the assignment
of possible improvement patents. The very fact that a patent
was to be assigned makes it obvious that the license exaction
itself would have no effect upon the business opportunities
of any person but the licensee who assigned the improvement
patent. The market would remain unaffected by the assignment; it had been restricted at the time that the Patent Office
granted the improvement patent. Correspondingly, no public
interest in maintaining competition would be affected by the
assignment; competition was foreclosed not by the assignment
but by the patent grant. Whereas in the misuse cases the
isolated transaction under scrutiny had, because of the very
terms of the license, affected and controlled the competitive
market, the assignment transaction in the instant case would
not have that effect.
This approach, while it exonerates from the taint of
monopoly the isolated licensing contract, detached from the
entire complex of the patentee's economic activity, does not.
leave the patentee free to extend its control at will. Obviously, danger may lie in the concentration of economic
power in the hands of a patentee. It is against this danger
of concentrated control, however acquired, that the anti-trust
laws are directed. 25 The broader focus of the anti-trust
laws is not confined to examining isolated transactions. On
the contrary, it considers each act against the background of
all relevant facts. Therefore while the patentee's license in
the instant case is not per se illegal, it must still undergo
an anti-trust examination.
25.

That a patent will not exempt a patentee from subjection to the

anti-trust laws, see Hartford Empire Co. v. U.S., 324 U.S. 570
(1944); Hartford Empire Co. v. U.S., 323 U.S., 386 (1944); U.S.

v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v.
U.S., 309 U.S. 436 (1939); United Shoe Mach. Co. v. U.S., 258
U.S. 451 (1922); Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. U.S., 226 U.S.

20 (1912).
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This interpretation recognizes that under the existing
patent system individual ownership of several patents may,
from the standpoint of manufacturing feasibility, be socially
desirable in many cases. It leaves each case to be considered
on its own facts, under anti-trust law. In sum, the Supreme
Court, and not the Circuit Court of Appeals, seems to have
been correct on precedent, in the instant case.
III.
The test as to the advisability of extending the application of the misuse doctrine beyond precedent may be said to
turn on the consequences of a licensor's use of a patent to acquire improvement patents. It is at this point that the real
problem of the instant case arises, a problem which the Court
did not, articulately at least, consider. Consequences which
may be argued to support the extension of the misuse doctrine to th6 retention of the improvement patents by the
licensor are that: it tends to discourage invention by the
licensee; it puts the licensee at a competitive disadvantage
to the licensor; it enables the licensor to extend its control
beyond the statutory life of its basic patent; it yields to the
licensor more than the basic patent grant was intended to
yield to it. The merits of these arguments deserve consideration.
The Circuit Court of Appeals contended that the result
of the licensor's contract was to put the licensee to the alternatives either of suppressing its normal inclination to improve or of renewing the contract to escape the consequences
of its own ingenuity.26 Neither alternative affords a sufficient reason to declare the license a misuse. The determination of what terms in a license will quell inventive genius
involves speculation in the realm of psychology. Witlout any
legal standards by which to test a transaction's effect, the
Court would be attempting to weigh the imponderable. Courts
have never resorted to such a psychological test in the case
of the industrial scientist who assigns all patents which
he obtains. Such contracts are enforced without question.
The "competitive disadvantage" of the licensee is no
more tangible a criterion for extending the misuse doctrine
to the license in the instant case than is the conjectural effect
26.

Stokes & Smith Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp., 156 F.2d
198, 203 (C.C.A.2d 1946).

1948]

NOTES

on invention. The Supreme Court has pointed out that the
misuse doctrine is invoked to protect public and not private
interests.27 "Competitive disadvantage" reduces itself to the
fact that the licensee has entered into a hard bargain with
the licensor. The only interests affected by the bargain are
the interests of the parties to it, and that without more is not
grounds for extension.
It is an undeniable consequence of the license that the
acquisition of improvement patents may enable the licensor
to maintain control over the technology covered by the basic
patent long after the basic patent has expired. While this is
an economic fact of the most serious possible implications, it
cannot be given legal significance in the instant case. For the
potential danger stems not from any peculiarity of this license
but from the patent system. Any patentee may, without the
intervention of a license contract, extend a monopoly well
beyond the statutory life of the basic patent. This it may
do by periodically obtaining improvement patents of sufficient importance to make competition with it impossible or
impracticable. It is thus apparent that in the consequence
under consideration the license in question reflects a practice not illegalized by patent law. Although investigation of
this practice might quite possibly reveal that it creates grave
perils to competitive free enterprise, it would then be the
practice as a whole at which condemnation should be directed.
This is a matter that requires attention by the Congress, and
until legislative action is taken the Court cannot consider it
in testing the validity of licenses.
Another consequence of using a basic patent to acquire
improvement patents is that the basic patentee extends its
control quantitatively to subjects not within the four corners
of the basic patent. This legalism, reiterated in various forms
particularly in the early misuse cases, 28 has little meaning
in itself. It served not as an analytical rationale for the
"misuse doctrine but only as a verbal formula to stigmatize
conduct after it had been decided to be illegal. It is perhaps
sufficient to say that in every case of a patent license the li27. See n. 22 supra.
28. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1941);

Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 32 (1930);
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516,
518 (1916); Henry v. A. B. Dick Co. 224 U.S. 1, 51 (1911) (dissenting opinion by White, C.J.).

INDIANA LAw JOURNAL

[Vol 23

censor acquires, and thereby extends his control to, rights
which were not granted within the four corners of the patent.
It is not the fact of control but what is controlled and how
control was established that are relevant. Therefore, the
mere fact that control is extended quantitatively cannot be
an invalidating consequence of this license.
It is apparent that the license in suit would necessarily
have certain consequences which are arguably adverse to
the public interest. These consequences, arising as they do
from the existing patent system rather than from this particular license, present problems for legislative consideration.
The bare possibility that this license may produce other results, peculiar to the facts of this case, affords no basis sufficiently certain to justify extension of the doctrine of misuse
beyond the established rule.

STATE LEGISLATION
REGULATION OF STRIP COAL MINING
I.
An Illinois statute' required the operator of strip coal
mines to level the spoil ridges to approximately the original
contour upon completion of mining operations. The statute
provided that the final cut could remain unfilled where the
adjacent spoil ridge was not sufficient to fill that cut.2 Certain coal mine operators 3 sought to enjoin the Director of
Mines and Minerals from enforcing the act, alleging a denial
of due process and equal protection. 4 The Illinois Supreme
1.
2.

Ill. Rev. Stat. (1943) c. 93, §162.
"Any person ... engaged in 'open cut' ov 'strip' mining in which
the soil over or covering any bed or strata of coal is removed
shall spread such soil so that the contour of the land is approximately the same as before the mining operation was begun. Such
levelling operations shall be done progressively . . . so that no
more than three spoil ridges shall be left unlevelled . . . . When
the mining . . . is completed, the remaining spoil ridges shall
shall be levelled . . . provided, however, that the operator shall
not be required to totally fill the last open cut where the adjacent
spoil ridge will not fill such cut." Ibid.
3. Plaintiffs were owners of 30,000 acres of strip mine land and producers of 95% of the total strip mined coal in Illinois.
4. The record indicates that plaintiffs invoked both the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and the following provisions of the Illinois Constitution: Article II, § 2
("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.") ; § 14 ("-No . . . law . . . making any

